The Myth of the Unbiased Director by Burch, Regina F.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Myth of the Unbiased Director
Regina F. Burch
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burch, Regina F. (2008) "The Myth of the Unbiased Director," Akron Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/4
BURCH_FINAL 3/23/2009 2:45 PM 
 
509 
 
THE MYTH OF THE UNBIASED DIRECTOR 
Regina F. Burch∗ 
I.    Introduction ....................................................................... 510 
II.   The Roles and Functions of the Board of Directors of 
Publicly Held United States Corporations ......................... 517 
A.   What Do Non-management Directors Do and What 
Roles and Functions Does U.S. Federal and State 
Law Envision for Non-management Directors? ......... 519 
B.   What Do Management Directors Do and What 
Roles and Functions Does U.S. Federal and State 
Law Envision for Management Directors? ................. 525 
C.   State and Federal Review of Directors’ Actions ......... 526 
III.   Empirical Approaches and Evidence ................................. 532 
A.   The Role of Risk in Corporate Law ............................ 533 
B. Emotions and Risk Perception .................................... 535 
C.  The Yale Law School Cultural Cognition Project’s 
Study on Cultural Bias and the White Male Effect ..... 537 
IV.   Mitigating the Effects of CIP Cognition Through 
Education and Legal Rules ................................................ 544 
A. What Does the Study Add to Our Understanding of 
How Cognitive Biases May Operate in Director 
Decision-making? ....................................................... 544 
B.   Specific Applications .................................................. 546 
C. Critique ....................................................................... 550 
V.    Directions for Future Research .......................................... 552 
A. How Do Board Members Perceive their Roles and 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; E-mail:  rburch@law.capital.edu.  I 
would like to thank Professors Athornia Steele and Mark Strasser, and participants at the 
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, the University of Iowa Summer Writing 
Conference, and the Inaugural Texas Junior Legal Scholars Conference for reviewing earlier drafts 
of this Article, discussing with me the substantive issues, and providing helpful suggestions.  Also, I 
extend my gratitude to my research assistants, Tiffany Auvdel, Patrick Jones, and Angela Opalenik.  
Finally, I would like to thank the administration at Capital University Law School for its support. 
1
Burch: The Myth of the Unbiased Director
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
BURCH_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:45 PM 
510 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:509 
 
Functions? ................................................................... 552 
B. How Do Boards Really Perceive Decision-making 
Risk? ........................................................................... 553 
C. Gender and Racial Diversity on Corporate Boards ..... 553 
D. Director Education ...................................................... 554 
VI.   Conclusion ......................................................................... 555 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission responded to 
concerns over high executive compensation levels and compensation-
driven conflicts of interest and promulgated new regulations requiring 
more disclosure about executive compensation.1  Also, recent federal 
and stock exchange laws and regulations emphasize the independent 
monitoring board as a mechanism to curtail accounting and financial 
fraud.  Moreover, post-Enron reforms may have led to an increase in the 
number of board positions available and greater opportunities for women 
and people of color to serve on public company boards.2  Boards have 
increased diversity in an attempt to meet the product and service needs 
of an increasingly diverse population and thereby improve corporate 
bottom lines.  Nonetheless, executive compensation remains high, 
accounting fraud and mismanagement persists, and board diversity is 
lacking. 
This Article seeks to use social science research to better 
understand why these and other corporate governance problems persist.  
One reason may be that boards are biased as to how they respond to 
these issues.  Social science research on risk perception informs us that 
individuals’ “preferences among different types of risk taking (or 
avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or 
ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different 
patterns of social relations.”3  Cultural theorists have identified four 
 1. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Executive Compensation and Related Party 
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 
239, 240, 245, 249, and 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf. 
 2. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, THE BOTTOM LINE ON BOARD DIVERSITY: A COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS RATIONALES FOR DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS, 1-2 (2005). 
 3. Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception; Who Fears What and Why?, 
119 DAEDALUS:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 43, 43 (1990).  See also Karl 
Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews 
and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 65 (1991) (describing an empirical 
2
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competing worldviews: communitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and 
egalitarian.4  The communitarian and individualistic worldviews are at 
opposite ends of a spectrum measuring the degree to which an 
individual’s self-identity and preferred social relations derive from 
membership in a group.5  For example, communitarians prefer to make 
decisions by consensus and value solidarity,6 while individualists prefer 
autonomy and self-regulation, and value market relationships and the 
freedom to bid and bargain for themselves.7  The egalitarian and 
hierarchical worldviews are at opposite ends of a scale measuring the 
degree to which an individual’s self-identity and preferred social 
relations derive from social differentiation.8  Egalitarians “value strong 
equality of outcome in the sense of diminishing distinctions among 
people such as wealth, race, gender, authority, etc.”9  By contrast, people 
who subscribe to a hierarchical worldview prefer “superior/subordinate” 
forms of social relations and role differentiation based on the distinctions 
(such as wealth and authority) disfavored by egalitarians.10 
A recent empirical study conducted by the Cultural Cognition 
Project at Yale University suggests that one type of cognitive bias—a 
misperception of the risks inherent in certain types of socially charged 
activities—may derive from a phenomenon termed “cultural-identity-
protective cognition (“CIP”).”11  Socially charged activities are those 
that are controversial and that carry social meaning.  Social meaning 
refers to an activity’s power to shape how one person perceives others 
who are engaged in that activity.12  The theory of CIP cognition 
research project to test and confirm the theory that “individuals choose what to fear (and how much 
to fear it) in order to support their way of life”). 
 4. See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 62-64 
(Routledge, 2d ed. 2003) (explaining in Douglas’ system of classification, a communitarian 
worldview corresponds to a high group social dimension, an individualistic worldview to a low 
group dimension, a hierarchical worldview to a high grid dimension, and an egalitarian worldview 
to a low grid dimension).  See also Steven Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL 
THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S. Krimsky & D. Goldin eds., 1992). 
 5. See DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 63.  See also Rayner, supra note 4, at 87. 
 6. Steven Rayner, Management of Radiation Hazards in Hospitals: Plural Rationalities in a 
Single Institution, 16 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 577, 581 (1986).  See also Rayner, supra note 4, at 90. 
 7. Dake, supra note 3, at 66. 
 8. See DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 62. 
 9. Dake, supra note 3, at 67. 
 10. Id. at 66-67. 
 11. Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White 
Male Effect in Risk Perception, J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995634. 
 12. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962520 
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proposes that an individual’s over or under emphasis of the risks 
associated with socially charged activities, such as gun ownership, 
abortions, and environmental pollution, may be due to the tendency for 
individuals to be biased in favor of or against activities in a manner that 
furthers social status.13  Under this view, status is not only 
socioeconomic status.  Status refers to the individual’s self-identity and 
social role(s) as reflected by that individual’s preferred worldview.14  
Status is dependent on cultural norms and is threatened by those holding 
opposing norms.15  In other words, an individual’s risk insensitivity (or 
oversensitivity) is tied to an individual’s worldview; “insensitivity to 
risk” may be a “defensive response to a form of cult
t.”16 
The Yale research study attempted to explain the “white male 
effect”—a “well documented pattern” showing that certain white men 
fear various risks less than women and minorities.17  Research on risk 
perception has demonstrated that a group of affluent, highly educated 
white males, who also tend to hold very hierarchical and individualistic 
norms, tend to misperceive (more so than white females and people of 
color) the risks of certain activities in a manner that is consistent with 
their worldviews.18  In fact, the research indicates that the risk 
perceptions of these males tends to be highly skewed in favor of 
activities that may be seen as advancing their status in society, and 
highly skewed against activities that tend to threaten their social status.19  
Evidence from the Yale study suggests that gender and race “influenced 
risk perception only in conjunction with distinctive worldviews that 
themselves feature either gender or race differentiation or both in social 
roles involving putatively dangerous activities.”20  Moreover, the 
variance among risk perceptions and the misperception of risks may 
derive more from variance among social norms, than f
(listing, as an example, that listening to rap music may be one example of a socially charged 
activity.  Rap music is the subject of some debate, and it calls to mind preconceived notions of rap 
tis s of activities in which rap artists engage). 
ing the “white male” effect). 
y be the case that oversensitivity to risk 
ved threats to one’s cultural identity. 
t 30-32. 
t 3. 
ar ts and the kind
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. See discussion infra Section III.C.1 (explain
 15. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 16. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 3.  It also ma
derives from percei
 17. Id. at 1. 
 18. Id. a
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. a
4
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ical affiliation, or any other personal characteristic.21 
The Yale research provides evidence of the general population’s 
CIP risk assessment bias related to gun control, environmental 
protection, and abortion availability policies—issues that have generated 
a great deal of political controversy.22  This Article proposes that CIP 
risk assessment may systematically bias director decision-making.  The 
basic premise is that directors of publicly traded U.S. corporations are 
not immune from the effects of bias driven by CIP cognition.  In 
addition, this Article is grounded in the notion that directors may 
predominantly subscribe to hierarchical worldviews.  A majority of the 
directors of large, publicly-held corporations are white males who are 
affluent and highly educated, and who hold executive positions or are 
retired from executive positions.23  Demonstrated ability to lead in a 
hierarchical organizational structure, to act quickly and decisively, and 
to commit to a decision are some of the attributes of individuals who 
achieve top management positions.24  These behavioral 
onsistent with hierarchical and individualistic norms. 
Moreover, this Article argues that directors’ decision-making may 
involve risk-taking with respect to matters that may carry a social 
charge.  For example, director monitoring of conflict of interest 
transactions, decisions regarding executive and director compensation, 
and recommendations to pursue or, more frequently, to terminate 
shareholder derivative litigation are controversial corporate governance 
issues.  Generally, the public has a negative perception of directors who 
award and receive high compensation packages, or who 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 10-12.  See also discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
 23. A recent study of Fortune 1000 companies demonstrated that women were represented on 
82% of corporate boards; 76% of Fortune 1000 boards included at least one ethnic minority.  See 
Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, 
and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2005).  
The number of companies with ethnic and gender diversity generally has increased over the last ten 
years.  See Business for Social Responsibility, Issue Brief: Board Diversity Recent Developments, 
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.cfm?DocumentID=443 (last visited November 
7, 2007).  The number of women and minorities as a percentage of the total number of board seats 
remains small.  For example, as of September 30, 2004, 1,195 board seats existed on Fortune 100 
companies, 16.9% of those were held by women, 14.9% were held by minorities.  THE ALLIANCE 
FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, WOMEN & MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 100 BOARDS 4 (2005), 
http://www.catalystwomen.org/files/full/ABD%20report.pdf.  Moreover, individuals held an 
average of 1.2 board seats.  Id. at 5.  African-American directors held an average of 1.5 board seats.  
While only one corporation had no women on its board, it was not uncommon to find a board with 
no minorities, particularly no Asian-Americans or Hispanic Americans.  Id. at 6. 
 24. See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 697-701 (2005). 
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corporations that reveal long-standing accounting fraud. 
Further, the article presents two strategies to neutralize the impact 
of CIP risk assessment on corporate decision-making.  One possible 
strategy may be that courts give greater scrutiny to directors’ decisions 
that particularly may be prone to risk assessment bias.   Generally, courts 
assume that directors’ decisions may be biased due to conflicts of 
interest arising from financial factors and familial relationships.  Courts 
may give greater scrutiny to directors’ decisions if the board is operating 
under a conflict of interest at the time of the transaction, or may give 
more deference to decisions made by a board (or a board committee) 
free from conflict.  However, courts also assume that other incentives, 
such as a need to protect one’s cultural identity, will not influence 
directors’ decisions (at least not in any way that regulation needs to 
address).  Courts may have underestimated the extent to which such 
cognitive bias influences director behavior.
nce that judges may need to take into account directors’ worldview 
biases when reviewing directors’ decisions. 
Moreover, courts take as a given that boards engage in risk-benefit 
analysis when making decisions, and, absent a conflict of interest, courts 
only look to whether the board was properly informed about the risks 
and benefits.  However, the Yale study’s results suggest that courts 
should discount board risk evaluation due to “cognitive biases and 
errors,” at least in some circumstances that currently do not receive close 
judicial review.25  In these circumstances, courts should engage in some 
hindsight evaluation of corporate actions because there is a high 
probability that the board’s risk evaluation expresses an inappropriate,
me individualistic and hierarchical norm that does not comport with 
the best interests of the shareholders and other corporate constituencies. 
If CIP risk assessment affects board behavior, then the Yale study’s 
results suggest that boards may need to take steps to ensure diversity in 
worldviews, as well as gender and race diversity, on corporate boards.  
The second strategy may be to encourage directors to ensure that the 
various worldviews are well represented on corporate boards.  This may 
be accomplished in part by educating directors about differing 
worldviews and about the costs and benefits of diversity in worldviews 
on corporate boards.  Director education at least may raise awareness of 
bias to a conscious level.  As a result, boards may seek board candidates 
 25. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 35. 
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would arise from worldviews not represented by the majority of the 
board.26 
Further, the Article suggests that although CIP cognition affects all 
directors, non-management directors may be better situated (after 
education) than management directors to provide a voice on the board to 
counteract the effects of CIP cognition.27  Non-management directors 
generally are not involved in day-to-day corporate operations.  Also, 
non-management directors often are free from financial ties to the 
corporation, other than receiving director compensation.  It may be that 
many types of bias influence director behavior; non-management 
directors may have less baggage to address.  Moreover, non-
management directors are supposed to behave according to legal and 
business norms that require non-management directors to exercise 
unbiased oversight.  However, it is conceivable that a director without 
financial or familial ties to the corporation or its executives may be more 
likely to become aware of bias and take steps to neutralize its effects. 
A longstanding debate exists about the non-management director’s 
proper role—protector of the shareholders or protector of other 
constituencies, including employees and others, sometimes at the 
expense of the shareholders.28  Empirical literature on this issue has 
 26. Paredes, supra note 24, at 740-41. 
 27. Courts and commentators use different terms to describe non-management directors, 
including “independent,” “disinterested,” “nonexecutive,” and “outside,” and use different terms to 
describe the ability of non-management directors to render unbiased judgments.  In this Article, I 
will borrow a term from a recent article by Donald C. Clarke that simply describes that the directors 
are not managers of the firm, and implies as little as possible about the directors’ ability to exercise 
unbiased judgment, “non-management directors.”  See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the 
Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 83-84 (2007).  Management directors hold executive 
positions within the corporation, such as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer.  Non-
management directors do not hold executive positions within the corporation.  Non-management 
directors are often senior executives at other corporations, public sector employees who are 
influential in political circles or in some other way influential in the corporation’s business, well-
regarded academics, or former or current counsel to the corporation.  Id. at 79. 
 28. Much of this debate originally was descriptive as well as normative.  Adolf A. Berle and 
Gardiner C. Means wrote their seminal piece on the role of directors and the agency cost problem in 
corporate governance at the end of a transformative period in American business.  ADOLF A. 
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY  
(Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1933) (1934).  Berle and Means argued that shareholders were 
becoming more numerous and more dispersed and that managers often did not have equity positions 
in the corporation.  Id. at 47, 119-21.  They posited that these facts would give rise to agency cost 
problems.  Id. at 121-25.  In other words, corporate managers no longer had the incentive to 
maximize value as owners, because managers generally were not owners.  Instead, managers had 
incentives to minimize the amount of work they had to do and maximize the salary they would 
receive.  Further, shareholders were too dispersed to take collective action easily, generally too 
uninterested to put out the effort to take action, and willing to let other shareholders bear the burden 
7
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sought to determine whether having a majority of non-management 
directors improves corporate financial performance.  This literature also 
seeks to provide a basis for making policy decisions about the need for, 
and functions of, non-management directors.29  The studies’ results are 
mixed.30  Some researchers suggest that non-management directors’ 
presence on corporate boards does little to improve corporate 
performance, while other evidence shows some benefit gained when 
independent directors perform certain functions on board committees.31 
This Article does not recommend that non-management directors 
are the solution to the problem of CIP risk assessment on corporate 
boards.  Also, it does not attempt to take a position about the proper role 
for non-management directors.  This Article suggests that, indeed, under 
our current corporate governance system, CIP risk assessment bias may 
be a difficult problem to solve.  There may be very few directors who 
are capable of exercising unbiased judgment in any directorial role.32  
To my knowledge, there is no empirical study to determine whether non-
management directors exercise more or less biased risk assessment than 
management directors.  Risk perception studies of directors’ behavior 
might provide answers. 
Section II explores directors’ various roles and functions.  
Empirical studies of director behavior and how they perceive their roles 
and functions are few and far between.  Part A describes non-
management directors’ roles and functions as stated in best practices of 
corporate governance industry groups and institutional investor 
literature.  Part B similarly discusses the roles and functions of the 
management director.  Part C discusses state and federal review of 
directors’ actions.  Section III discusses the empirical evidence.  Part A 
discusses some of the ways that risk assessment plays a role in corporate 
of keeping management in check.  Id.  The Berle and Means piece became the keystone for the 
shareholder primacy debate.  See Clarke, supra note 27, at 85 n.41.  The debate has transformed 
from one mostly that seeks to describe the role of the director in corporate governance, to one that 
mostly seeks to state normatively and prescriptively what the directors’ role should be.  See id. at 79 
n.30, 84-85 (citing literature on the role of the board of directors in corporate governance, and the 
shareholder versus stakeholder primacy debate). 
 29. See generally Dennis Wright Michaud & Kate A. Margaram, Recent Technical Papers on 
Corporate Governance 2 (Brown U. Corp. Governance Program, Working Paper, 2006), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=895520. 
 30. See id.  See also Clarke, supra note 27, at 75 (citing recent literature). 
 31. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 27, at 75-76; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of 
Independence 1, 4 (U. Ga. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513. 
 32. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, 
Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 1079-86 (2005). 
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law and how emotions and cognitive bias impact risk assessment.  Part B 
introduces theoretical and empirical research on how an individual’s 
demographic characteristics and cultural norms impact risk assessment.  
In addition, Part B discusses the Yale study on cultural bias and the 
white male effect.  This part suggests that cognitive bias is inherent on 
publicly traded boards and effects board perception of risk-taking.33  
Section IV discusses what the Yale study may add to our understanding 
of cognitive bias on corporate boards.  It further develops the idea that 
there is no such person as an unbiased director, and that bias 
systematically influences board decision-making.  Section IV discusses 
possibilities for legal rule reform and director education as ways to 
neutralize or mitigate the effects of CIP risk assessment bias.  Each 
subpart of Part A discusses potential strategies to neutralize the effects 
of CIP risk assessment bias.  Part B discusses objections to the strategies 
offered in Part A and offers counterarguments to those objections.  
Section IV’s mitigation strategies suggest a framework for further 
studies of director behavior.  Possible theoretical and empirical studies 
are described in Section V.  As one legal scholar recently warned, 
“caution is warranted before corporate governance is revamped radically 
to address CEO overconfidence or other aspects of managerial 
psychology.”34  The Conclusion stresses that making directors more 
aware of worldview bias likely requires more than one legal, cultural or 
cognitive change.  Further study may shed light on the types of change 
warranted. 
II. THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
PUBLICLY HELD UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS 
In the United States, state law primarily defines the role of the 
board of directors with respect to governing the corporation, 
relationships with the shareholders and other corporate constituencies, 
and other matters of corporate governance.35  State law does not list 
detailed responsibilities and functions of the board of directors; instead 
state corporations statutes broadly define director responsibilities and 
functions.36  Specifically, matters such as appointment of the chief 
 33. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 34. Paredes, supra note 24, at 681. 
 35. See id. at 147. 
 36. See, e.g. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised 
by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of 
the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight of its board 
of directors. . . .”); 8 DEL. C. § 141(a) (West 2007) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
9
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officers responsible for day-to-day corporate operations; managing the 
director election process; setting salaries and compensation of directors 
and officers; distributing corporate assets; formulating corporate 
strategy; recommending major corporate business action to shareholders; 
disseminating information about the company’s finances and other 
important business matters; ensuring adequate information flows from 
the top down and the bottom up; hiring and overseeing auditors; and 
managing corporate litigation are all within the ultimate authority of the 
board under state statutes and state case law.37 
Recently, and to a greater extent than in the past, federal law also 
impacts corporate governance.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOA”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 
self-regulatory rules promulgated thereunder, prescribe the 
composition38 and responsibilities39 of a publicly-traded corporation’s 
audit committee, and the composition40 and responsibilities41 of the 
corporation’s compensation committee.42 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. . . 
.”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 2007). 
The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the direction of the board.  The board may delegate the 
management of the day-to-day operation of the business of the corporation to a 
management company or other person provided that the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised under the 
ultimate direction of the board. 
Id. 
 37. See, e.g., 8 DEL. C. § 121(a) (West 2007). 
In addition to the powers enumerated in Section 122 of this title, every corporation [and] 
its . . . directors . . . shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges granted 
by this chapter or by any other law or by its certificate of incorporation, together with 
any powers incidental thereto. . . . 
Id.  Section 122 states that: 
[e]very corporation created under this chapter shall have power to: . . . (2) sue and be 
sued . . . in its corporate name; . . . (5) appoint such officers and agents as the business of 
the corporation requires and . . . pay . . . them suitable compensation. 
8 DEL. C. § 122 (West 2007).  Section 141(a) empowers directors to manage or to direct the 
management of the corporation.  Section 170(a) authorizes directors to declare dividends.  Section 
213(a) empowers directors to fix the record date to determine stockholders entitled to vote at a 
meeting of stockholders.  Section 251(b) requires that directors adopt a resolution “approving an 
agreement of merger” prior to submitting the agreement to the stockholders.  See 8 DEL. C. §§ 141, 
170, 213, 251 (West 2007). 
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3) (West Supp. 2002)) 
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(3)). 
 39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(2) (West Supp. 2002)) 
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(2)). 
 40. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(a) (2004), 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf. 
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Board members of publicly traded corporations are either employed 
by the corporation as corporate officers and executives or are not 
employed by the corporation in a management function.43  This Article 
will use the term “management directors” to describe directors who are 
employed as corporate officers and executives; it will borrow the term 
“non-management directors” to describe directors who do not hold 
corporate management positions.44  The distinction is important for a 
number of reasons.  First, state and federal law envision different roles 
for management directors versus non-management directors.45  Second, 
empirical studies investigate whether there is a relationship between 
disinterested and independent directors on corporate boards—as a 
practical matter these are usually non-management directors—and 
corporate performance.46  Third, to the extent that cognitive bias 
deriving from management positions or conflicts of interest—such as 
chief executive overconfidence and structural bias—influence director 
decision-making, directors without such bias may be better situated to 
exert an unbiased influence on board decision-making processes. 
A.   What Do Non-management Directors Do and What Roles and 
Functions Does U.S. Federal and State Law Envision for Non-
management Directors? 
Non-management directors are in the best position to describe what 
 41. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(b)(i) (2004), 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf. 
 42. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the 
Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 482, 504-06 (2006) (describing corporate 
directors’ and officers’ fiduciary standards of care after SOA). 
 43. Indeed, under SOA a corporation must have non-management directors on the board to 
fulfill the requirements of SOA § 301 and the stock exchange listing rules specified in supra notes 
40-41.  According to a recent survey, virtually all publicly traded corporation boards have a 
majority of non-management directors. 
 44. The term non-management director simply describes a director who currently is not part 
of the corporation’s management team.  I use the term non-management director throughout this 
Article because it implies nothing about whether the director is independent or disinterested as those 
terms are used for purposes of compliance with state or federal law requirements.  The legal 
requirements imposed by state and federal law may limit what a non-management director may do 
and still be in compliance with state or federal law.  See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 27, at 78-80. 
 45. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  See also LAWRENCE D. BROWN & MARCUS L. 
CAYLOR, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY: THE 
CORRELATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE  2-4 (2004), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/Patrick-
McGurn.pdf (independent board of directors, nominating committees, and compensation 
committees linked to improved firm performance). 
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they do, how they perceive their roles and functions, the content of their 
communications between other non-management directors and 
management directors, and whether or not they explicitly recognize the 
potential that their decision-making will be affected by cognitive bias.  
However, in the absence of narrative evidence from non-management 
directors, corporate industry groups, institutional investors and their 
groups, anecdotal evidence from comments to proposed federal and 
stock exchange regulations dealing with the issue of independence, news 
reports in connection with major corporate transactions and 
announcements, and after-the-fact investigations into allegations of 
board-level wrongdoing are probably the best sources of information on 
the roles and functions of non-management directors.47 
For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System’s (“CalPERS”) view of the role of the non-management director 
contemplates that the non-management director is an “independent 
director”—that is, one whose relationships with the company or its 
management would not foreclose the director from exercising unbiased 
judgment.48  “Independence is the cornerstone of accountability”49 and, 
 47. The body of empirical legal, economic, and management scholarship on independent 
directors is growing.  See, e.g., Barbara R. Bergmann, Needed: A New Empiricism, 4 THE 
ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 1-4 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2/art2. This 
growth stems from a renewed emphasis on corporate governance and accountability combined with 
calls from Congress, federal agencies, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
stock exchange regulatory organizations for more independence on corporate boards.  Id. 
 48. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System is an organization that provides and 
administers health and retirement benefits to California’s public employees and employers.  See 
CalPERS Online, About CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/home.xml (last 
visited August 2, 2007).  CalPERS defines an “independent director” as a director who: 
[H]as not been employed by the Company in an executive capacity within the last five 
years; 
[I]s not, and is not affiliated with a company that is, an adviser or consultant to the 
Company or a member of the Company’s senior management; 
[I]s not affiliated with a significant customer or supplier of the Company; 
[H]as no personal services contract(s) with the Company, or a member of the 
Company’s senior management; 
[I]s not affiliated with a not-for-profit entity that receives significant contributions from 
the Company; 
[W]ithin the last five years, has not had any business relationship with the Company 
(other than service as a director) for which the Company has been required to make 
disclosure under Regulation S-K of the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
[I]s not employed by a public company at which an executive officer of the Company 
serves as a director; has not had any of the relationships described above with any 
affiliate of the Company; 
[A]nd is not a member of the immediate family of any person  described above. 
THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORE PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (1998), http://web.archive.org/web/20000918044843/www.calpers-
12
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in CalPERS’ view, accountability leads to good corporate governance.  
Moreover, CalPERS states that independence means the director has no 
“personal, financial or professional” conflicts of interest that would 
preclude the director from acting in the shareholder’s best interests.50 
In CalPERS’ view, the non-management director is as influential as 
executive management, both in monitoring corporate activities and in 
creating strategic change.  CalPERS recognizes that its vision may not 
be the best fit for all corporations but, significantly, stresses that the 
leadership of the board must embrace director independence.51  Thus, if 
the lead board position—Chairman of the Board—also is held by the 
lead executive position—Chief Executive Officer—then CalPERS 
recommends that the independent directors appoint a lead independent 
director to coordinate the activities of the independent directors.52  
Specifically, the lead independent director would facilitate the flow of 
information to and among the non-management directors and between 
the non-management directors and the board’s executive members, 
influence who would serve as directors on board committees and as 
committee chairs, and would facilitate the board’s decision-making 
process, among other responsibilities.53 
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf [hereinafter CORE 
PRINCIPLES]. 
 49. CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 48, at 4. 
 50. Id. at 5. 
 51. Id. at 6-7. 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. Id. at 14.  The lead independent director’s duties would include: 
[A]dvise the Chair as to an appropriate schedule of Board meetings, seeking to ensure 
that the independent directors can perform their duties responsibly while not interfering 
with the flow of Company operations; 
[P]rovide the Chair with input as to the preparation of the agendas for the Board and 
Committee meetings; 
[A]dvise the Chair as to the quality, quantity and timeliness of the flow of information 
from Company management that is necessary for the independent directors to 
effectively and responsibly perform their duties; although Company management is 
responsible for the preparation of materials for the Board, the Lead Independent 
Director may specifically request the inclusion of certain material; 
[R]ecommend to the Chair the retention of consultants who report directly to the Board; 
[I]nterview, along with the chair of the [nominating committee], all Board candidates, 
and make recommendations to the [nominating committee] and the Board; 
[A]ssist the Board and Company officers in assuring compliance with and 
implementation of the Company’s [Governance Guidelines]; principally responsible for 
recommending revisions to the [Governance Guidelines]; 
[C]oordinate, develop the agenda for and moderate executive sessions of the Board’s 
independent directors; act as principal liaison between the independent directors and the 
Chair on sensitive issues; 
[E]valuate, along with the members of the [compensation committee/full board], the 
13
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According to the Business Roundtable (“BRT”), an association of 
chief executive officers and “an authoritative voice on matters affecting 
American business corporations,”54 “making decisions regarding the 
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical 
CEO is the single most important function of the board.”55  In addition 
to selecting and overseeing the CEO and other corporate management 
who oversee the day-to-day operations of the corporation, the board’s 
oversight responsibilities include: 
[P]lanning for management development and succession; 
understanding, reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the 
corporation’s strategic plans; understanding and approving annual 
operating plans and budgets; focusing on the integrity and clarity of the 
corporation’s financial statements and financial reporting; advising 
management on significant issues facing the corporation; reviewing 
and approving significant corporate actions; reviewing management’s 
plans for business resiliency; nominating directors and committee 
members and overseeing effective corporate governance; and 
overseeing legal and ethical compliance.56 
The directors delegate responsibility for managing the corporation’s 
affairs to the chief senior executive.57  However, the directors should 
“exercise vigorous and diligent oversight of a corporation’s affairs.”58 
Similar to CalPERS, the BRT envisions that independent directors 
play a significant role, both in monitoring corporate affairs and in 
approving specific transactions.59  According to the BRT, a board 
“should have a substantial degree of independence from management” 
when fulfilling its oversight role.60  According to the BRT’s governance 
principles, “[p]roviding objective, independent judgment is at the core of 
the board’s oversight function and the board’s composition should 
reflect this principle.”61 
CEO’s performance; meet with the CEO to discuss the Board’s evaluation; and 
[R]ecommend to the Chair the membership of the various Board Committees, as well as 
selection of the Committee chairs in addition to the general duties of board members. 
Id. at 13-14. 
 54. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, 1 (2005), 
http://64.203.97.43/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 8-10. 
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 14. 
 61. Id. 
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The BRT’s definition of independence appears narrower than the 
CalPERS definition, in that the BRT’s definition excludes “business, 
employment, charitable or personal” relationships with the company or 
its management that in fact or appearance would render the director 
unable to exercise “independent judgment.”62  On the other hand, the 
CalPERS definition forecloses all relationships that might bias an 
independent director’s judgment.  However, the board as a whole 
determines whether a director is or is not independent, taking into 
account “the federal securities laws, securities market listing standards, 
and the views of institutional investors and other relevant groups.”63 
Furthermore, the BRT recommends that the board have 
independent leadership, either by separating the roles of CEO and 
chairperson of the board, by creating and filling a lead director position 
who plays a key role in evaluating the CEO’s performance (among other 
roles), or by appointing a non-management director to preside over 
executive sessions of non-management directors.64 
Federal and state laws and regulations embody various formulations 
of independence and envisage different roles and functions for non-
management directors.65  State statutes define independence with respect 
to whether the director has an interest in a particular transaction.66  For 
example, non-management directors may review conflict of interest 
transactions and may determine if those transactions comply with a 
director’s fiduciary duties at the state level.  In this scenario, non-
management directors function as “a substitute for external regulation” 
primarily at the state level and possibly as a gatekeeper to protect 
shareholders from director “overreaching.”67 
Federal law and related regulations appear to envision that non-
management directors primarily protect shareholders from 
management’s abuse of power and misuse of assets.  SOA sets standards 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 15. 
 65. Clarke, supra note 27, at 79-84. 
 66. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.64; 8 DEL. C. § 144(a)(1) (West 2007).  For 
a more detailed discussion of state law with respect to director independence in the context of 
conflict of interest transactions, see infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 67. Clarke, supra note 27, at 80.  The law may contemplate that non-management directors 
function as a brain trust, as protectors of minority shareholders’ interests against the actions of 
dominant shareholders, as gatekeepers who use their voting power to ensure the corporation 
complies with external legal standards, as whistleblowers who alert external authorities to 
noncompliance with legal obligations, or as authorities who certify that the corporation is in 
compliance with law.  Id. at 80-83.  Conflict of interest transactions are sometimes described as 
“related party transactions.”  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, §§ 8.60-8.64 (2005). 
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for audit committee independence and requires that the SEC require the 
stock exchange self-regulatory organizations to mandate that listed 
companies comply with the independence standards or face delisting.68  
Under SOA, independence is broadly defined as an absence of financial, 
business, and familial ties to the corporation.69 
Stock exchange rules require independence on board committees, 
including the audit, nominating, and compensation committees.70  Also, 
listed companies are required to have a certain number of independent 
directors.71  Generally, independence is defined as a director who does 
not accept any compensatory fee from the corporation, other than fees 
accepted in his capacity as a director, and who is not an affiliate—a 
controlling shareholder—of the corporation.72 
Commentators to the SEC’s proposed rule implementing SOA’s 
independence requirements point mostly to a concern among 
corporations that the federal rules may prove too inflexible to benefit 
corporations given the great variety among corporate governance 
structures, board compositions, and board member knowledge of 
auditing and accounting practices.73  Also, commentators have 
 68. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)).  See also 
Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act (as added by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 301), 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm. 
 69. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)) (defining 
independence); Securities Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(1) (17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3) (defining 
“affiliated person” for purposes of section 301). 
 70. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.04 (requiring that the 
nominating/corporate governance committee is “composed entirely of independent directors”).  See 
also id. at § 303A.05 (requiring that the compensation committee is “composed entirely of 
independent directors”).  The New York Stock Exchange requires that listed companies have audit 
committees that meet the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley § 301.  See id. at § 303A.06.  See also 
NASDAQ,  Inc., Manual § 4350(d)(2), available at http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/ 
display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=18 (requiring that the audit committee is composed entirely of 
independent directors).  See generally Clarke, supra note 27, at 86-91 (comparing various 
committee powers under the SOA, the NYSE and Nasdaq rules).  For discussion of enforcement of 
the independence requirements see infra Section II.C.3. 
 71. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.01 (requiring that 
independent directors comprise a majority on listed company boards).  See also NASDAQ,  Inc., 
Manual, supra note 70, at § 4350(d)(2)(A) (requiring independent directors comprise a majority on 
listed company boards). 
 72. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, supra note 40, at § 303A.02; Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451, 14,452 (Mar. 25, 2003); NASDAQ,  
Inc., Manual, supra note 70, at § 4350(c). 
 73. Commentators pointed out that perhaps the self-regulatory organizations were best suited 
to set additional independence criteria beyond the audit committee independence requirements.  See 
Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees Exchange Act (as added by Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 301) supra note 68, at § II.A.1. 
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expressed concerns about the potential lack of qualified individuals who 
could serve as independent board members.74  However, many 
corporations already had some of the reform 75
One rationale behind independence requirements at both the federal 
and state levels is that an independent director would be less likely to act 
due to cognitive bias and against shareholders’ interests.76  Whether 
defined on a transactional basis, as at the state level, or defined in the 
abstract and in the absence of a transaction, as at the federal level, all of 
the definitions of independence contemplate that a director truly can be 
systematically unbiased.  However, the rules seek to address bias arising 
from financial and other ties to management, not worldview bias. 
B.   What Do Management Directors Do and What Roles and Functions 
Does U.S. Federal and State Law Envision for Management 
Directors? 
According to CalPERS, the Chief Executive Officer’s primary 
function is to manage the day-to-day operations of a company and to 
speak publicly on its behalf.77  Additionally, the CEO recommends the 
company’s policy and strategic direction, subject to board approval.78 
The BRT provides a more detailed statement on the roles of the 
chief executive and senior managers.  The CEO and senior management 
develop long-term strategic plans as well as annual operating plans and 
budgets and submit them to the board for approval.79  Also, senior 
management is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the 
strategic plan, management of the corporation’s “overall risk profile,” 
and preparation of the corporation’s financial statements.80 
The BRT emphasizes that the CEO should be “a person of 
integrity,” who will, with senior executives, establish an ethical 
 74. See, e.g., id. at § II.A.5 (discussing the SEC’s attempt to balance independence 
requirements with the need to find qualified board nominees to serve on audit committees), § 
II(F)(1) (discussing the SEC’s recognition that issuers may need time under the new rule to find 
qualified audit committee members). 
 75. For example, corporations increasingly had begun to appoint a majority of non-
management directors on boards. 
 76. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 106.  Clarke also discusses how the different functions give 
rise to different definitions of who is independent.  Id. at 84-86. 
 77. CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 48, at 17. 
 78. Id. 
 79. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 54, at 10-
11. 
 80. Id. at 11. 
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corporate culture.81  To ensure ethical corporate operation, the Business 
Roundtable recommends that a CEO be “a person of integrity” 
responsible for the corporation’s adherence to “the highest ethical 
standards.”82  Although independent directors may be ultimately 
responsible for a corporation’s ethical climate, the senior executives are 
responsible for establishing and designing ethics compliance programs, 
and for ensuring the existence of a process to alert senior executives and 
the board to red flags indicating unethical corporate conduct.83 
The standard of review for management directors’ actions is the 
same essentially as the standard of review for non-management 
directors’ actions.  However, courts expect that management directors 
will be more familiar with day-to-day operations, and review 
management director actions with that expectation in mind. 
The above discussion highlights that different behavioral norms 
exist for management and non-management directors, and that different 
expectations exist for management and non-management directors with 
respect to bias.  The next section examines how state and federal law 
reviews director behavior, especially with regard to board risk evaluation 
and shareholder claims of structural bias. 
C.   State and Federal Review of Directors’ Actions 
1. State Court Review 
Corporate directors owe a duty to act with due care, with loyalty, 
and in good faith.84  Directors as a group are expected to exercise care in 
decision-making and to fully deliberate making the rational decisions of 
a reasonable director under like circumstances.85  If they do, then absent 
a conflict of interest, courts grant their decisions deferential review 
under the business judgment standard of review.86  If they do not, then 
directors may be required to prove that their actions are fair.87 
 81. Id. at 12. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (2005); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds). 
 85. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (2005). 
 86. See Burch, supra note 42, at 503-06 (describing business judgment doctrine and court 
review of directors’ decisions). 
 87. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 
DEL. C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007).  While Delaware’s statute (and other states’ statutes) authorizes 
corporations to eliminate directors’ personal liability for breaches of the duty of care, the statute 
18
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Courts have at times applied an explicit or implicit, traditional, 
cost-benefit approach to review director decision-making.88  Courts may 
examine whether directors engaged in proper deliberation of costs and 
benefits; however, under business judgment review, courts will not 
question whether directors properly weighed those costs and benefits.89  
Courts have found that those decisions lack due care in only a handful of 
cases.90  For example, in Joy v. North, Judge Winter explained that the 
business judgment rule provides incentives for directors not to undertake 
“overly cautious” decisions.91  The case involved a series of loans by 
Citytrust to Katz Corporation, a property developer that was undergoing 
increasing financial difficulties.92  Judge Winter evaluated the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success in proving that the directors breached their duty of 
care by comparing the potential benefit of the loans—”the interest [that 
Citytrust] could have earned in less risky, more diversified loans”—to 
the potential risks—the loss of an increasingly large of amount of 
principal loaned to Katz.93  Judge Winter found that the plaintiff’s 
chances of success were high. (The bank was in a classic “no win” 
situation.)94 
does not authorize corporations to eliminate liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.  Id.  Further, 
in theory the statute only authorizes corporations to limit directors’ personal liability—it does not 
eliminate directors’ personal liability for due care breaches.  In practice, directors rarely face 
personal liability for breach of due care. 
 88. For explicit cost-benefit analysis dealing with the application of the business judgment 
rule, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), in which the court stated: 
[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the 
interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate 
decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, 
while the alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit. Shareholders 
can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the 
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best 
choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in 
others.  Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not 
bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the 
volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly 
riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally. 
Id. at 886. 
 89. Proper evaluation of risk in these circumstances involves full consideration of the pros 
and the cons of a particular course of action. 
 90. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1089-93 (2006). 
 91. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
 92. See id. at 882. 
 93. Id. at 896. 
 94. The court stated: 
The loss to Citytrust resulted from decisions which put the bank in a classic 
“no win” situation. The Katz venture was risky and increasingly so. By 
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Judge Winter compared the case to Litwin v. Allen, another example 
of explicit court review of director risk-taking strategies.95  In Litwin, a 
bank purchased bonds with a seller’s option to repurchase at the sale 
price.96  If the market value of the bonds increased above the sale price 
(the option price) then the seller would repurchase the bonds at the lower 
price (the option price) and resell them at the market price.  Thus, the 
purchaser would lose the difference between the sale price (the option 
price) and the value of the bonds at the time of repurchase.  If the market 
value of the bonds decreased, then the seller would not repurchase the 
bonds.  The buyer would sell the bonds on the market for less than the 
price at which he purchased them.  The court found that the defendant 
directors who agreed to the terms of this deal breached their fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders because the directors entered into a transaction 
in which there was no possibility of a gain on the original sale.97 
Management directors may be held to a higher standard of care 
under some state statutes.98  Management directors are expected to know 
more about day-to-day operations and to use that knowledge fully when 
making decisions.99  Courts at times, again implicitly or explicitly, 
indicate that management directors’ actions will be reviewed under a 
somewhat more exacting standard.100  Nonetheless, management 
directors are protected by the business judgment doctrine, exculpatory 
provisions, and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.101 
If a plaintiff claims that directors breached the duty of loyalty, 
continuing extensions of substantial amounts of credit the bank subjected the 
principal to those risks although its potential gain was no more than the 
interest it could have earned in less risky, more diversified loans. In a real 
sense, there was a low ceiling on profits but only a distant floor for losses. 
Id. 
 95. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. 1940). 
 96. See id. at 676. 
 97. Id. at 697-98.  In the traditional language of investment risk assessment, the court stated: 
Although, as I have said, there is no case precisely in point, it would seem that if it is 
against public policy for a bank, anxious to dispose of some of its securities, to agree to 
buy them back at the same price, it is even more so where a bank purchases securities 
and gives the seller the option to buy them back at the same price, thereby incurring the 
entire risk of loss with no possibility of gain other than the interest derived from the 
securities during the period that the bank holds them. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 
DEL. C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007) (all directors took a unified position on the legal issues and so 
were treated as one). 
 101. See Black et al., supra note 90, at 1089-94. 
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courts first review whether the directors (or a board committee) were 
disinterested and independent with respect to the challenged 
transaction.102  Definitions of disinterest and independence vary, but 
generally a director is interested in the transaction if he or she has a 
financial interest in the transaction (or if he or she has a familial 
relationship with someone who has a financial interest in the 
transaction), and a director lacks independence if the director cannot 
make a decision uninfluenced by management.103  For example, a 
significant financial interest in the transaction, including a philanthropic 
interest, may render a director not disinterested.104  A significant 
incentive to remain on the board of directors, such as stock options that 
only vest if a director remains on the board, may render a director non-
independent.105  However, “[a]llegations of mere personal friendship or 
a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”106 
Common law rules require a review of the entire fairness of 
directors’ decisions if there are conflicts of interest, absent approval or 
ratification of the transaction by disinterested and independent directors, 
or by a majority of disinterested shareholders.107  One rationale for strict 
review is that if a conflict of interest exists, then there is a higher risk 
that director self-interest will bias assessment of the costs and benefits of 
a decision.  Entire fairness review is the mechanism state courts use to 
 102. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63.  Historically at common law, conflict of 
interest transactions were void.  Over time, courts developed a doctrine of judicial review of conflict 
transactions.  Under this review, conflict transactions were voidable if the transactions were “unfair” 
to the corporation or to shareholders.  In reviewing these transactions, courts examine whether the 
price and other terms of the deal are fair, and whether the negotiations (between the parties) were 
fair.  Moreover, courts have developed mechanisms by which directors, officers and controlling 
shareholders may seek from shareholders or independent directors prior approval or ratification of 
self-interested transactions.  MELVIN AARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 434-63 (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 2001). 
 103. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60. 
 104. Michael Bobelian, Uncompromising Friendship, 4 CORP. COUNS. 6, 38 (2004) (“Last 
summer a Delaware Chancery Court judge ruled that Joseph Grundfest couldn't be considered an 
independent director at Oracle Corporation because the company had significant philanthropic ties 
to Stanford University, where Grundfest is a law professor ["Non-Independence Day," August 
2003].”). 
 105. Id. (“[T]his past January another chancery court judge found that Scott Cook wasn't an 
independent director at eBay, Inc., because he held stock options in the company that would vest 
only if he remained on the board.”  Cook's future appointment as a director, “in turn, rested with 
eBay's non-independent directors ["Spinning into Trial," April].”). 
 106. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (noting that directors’ personal ties to 
Stewart did not render them non-independent and unable to make unbiased decisions about whether 
derivative litigation should proceed). 
 107. See, e.g., Lewis v. Austen, 1999 WL 378125, at *4 (Del.Ch. June 2, 1999). 
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ensure that corporations and shareholders are not harmed by directors’ 
pecuniary conflicts of interest.108  Under this standard, courts review 
directors’ actions to determine whether, in the course of a transaction, 
the shareholders on the whole received a fair value for their investment 
and if the process by which directors negotiated the transaction mimics 
an arms length bargaining process.109  Director action—for example, 
compensation decisions, special litigation committee recommendations, 
and management buy-outs and other related-party transactions—which 
would otherwise receive review under the entire fairness standard, are 
subject to the more deferential business judgment standard if the 
transaction is approved or ratified by independent and disinterested 
directors (or majority shareholders).110 
As a practical matter, non-management directors often are 
disinterested and independent with respect to conflict of interest 
transactions.111  Non-management director review and approval cleanses 
board decisions that may be subject to shareholder attack due to board 
conflicts of interest.112  Thus, in practice, a disinterested, independent, 
non-management director’s most important function from a state court 
litigation perspective is to monitor related party transactions for 
compliance with law and insulate the board from shareholder suits for 
conflict of interest transactions.113  Again, under statutory approaches, 
an unfair transaction that has not been reviewed and approved by 
independent and disinterested non-management directors may be 
overturned by the court.  In these situations directors may be subject to 
monetary penalties.114 
2. State Judicial and Legislative Approaches to Shareholder 
Claims of Director Bias 
Bias is commonly viewed as “a particular tendency or inclination, 
esp[ecially] one that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question; 
 108. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 104 (explaining whether state law independence 
requirements work to protect shareholders from overreaching depends on whether shareholders sue 
and whether courts fairly will judge the case). 
 109. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 110. See Lewis, 1999 WL 378125, at *4. 
 111. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 106 (explaining protection from litigation may be one reason 
why corporations appoint independent directors to boards). 
 112. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61-8.63. 
 113. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 107-08. 
 114. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31. 
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prejudice.”115  Social science researchers have identified several forms 
of bias, including status quo bias, overconfidence bias, availability 
effect, and probability neglect.  Also, courts have recognized the threat 
that cognitive bias may “corrupt the directors’ judgment.”116  However, 
legal norms reflect a limited view of influence-corrupting bias, whereas, 
social science research suggests a broader view of bias that distorts 
decision-making and risk perception.117 
Given the availability and use of mechanisms to cleanse conflict 
transactions, state courts have taken a somewhat skeptical view to 
shareholder claims that directors’ decisions are nonetheless biased.118  A 
plaintiff who challenges whether a director is disinterested and 
independent may succeed on her claim if she can prove facts 
demonstrating that the board either lacked independence or had a 
financial, business, or personal interest in the transaction.119  In contrast, 
courts often disregard claims that directors are biased due to a “there but 
for the grace of God go I”-type sympathy for defendant directors, or due 
to other incentives.120  Certain types of bias fail to indicate a conflict of 
interest without additional evidence of improper influence.121 
3. Federal Review 
Corporate boards face different requirements with respect to 
director independence under federal law.122  The rules contemplate that 
there is a need for systematic board independence, regardless of the 
existence of related-party and other conflict of interest transactions.123  
Thus, under federal law the distinction between non-management 
directors and management directors is important for compliance with 
stock exchange rules. 
A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty per se does not exist 
under federal statutes or federal common law.  Enforcement of federal 
independence requirements includes liability under the federal securities 
 115. THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 202 (2d ed. 2006). 
 116. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 108 (1985). 
 117. See id. at 85-108. 
 118. See Lewis v. Austen, 1999 WL 378125, at *4 (Del.Ch. June 2, 1999). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
 121. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1053-54 (Del. 2004). 
 122. See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Clarke, supra note 27, at 84 (explaining that a theme in corporate law scholarship is 
that independent directors serve as a check on the agency cost problem). 
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laws for false or misleading disclosures and delisting for noncompliance 
with self-regulatory organization rules. 
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 
The body of empirical research on the relationship between outside 
directors, independent directors, and corporate performance has grown 
in recent years.124  This research is not wholly persuasive that the 
presence of outside or independent directors has a positive impact on 
economic measures of firm success, such as stock price or higher tender 
offers for target company stock.125  Thus, some use the research results 
to question the value of rules-based independence regimes, such as that 
exemplified by SOA and the listing exchanges.126 
Others point to the fact that some studies rely on directors’ reports 
of independence; boards may use inconsistent standards to determine if 
directors are independent.  Also, cross-study comparisons are difficult 
because some examine whether having non-management directors on the 
board has a positive impact on economic measures of firm success, 
while other studies examine whether having independent and 
disinterested directors on the board has a positive impact on economic 
measures of firm success.  As described above, non-management 
directors are not necessarily disinterested or independent under state and 
federal law.  To some degree, the studies try to determine whether value 
exists when unbiased (as in independent and disinterested) directors 
monitor corporate executives. 
Recent empirical research conducted by Yale Law School’s 
Cultural Cognition Project may provide a different view of cognitive 
bias on corporate boards.  The Yale researchers sought (and continue to 
gather) data to test a theorized connection between a respondent’s 
cultural identity, demographic characteristics such as gender and race, 
and perceptions of risks attributed to certain socially charged policies—
gun control, environmental control, and access to abortions.  The 
researchers sought an explanation for the “white male effect”—a phrase 
that refers to research findings that a discrete group of white males 
consistently rate the risks of a variety of hazards (e.g., climate change, 
cigarette smoking, street drugs, and AIDS) at a much lower level than 
females and nonwhites.127  When compared to the rest of the study 
 124. See Michaud & Margaram, supra note 29, at 5-10. 
 125. See Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 19-21. 
 126. See id. at 53-54. 
 127. Melissa L. Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield, 
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population, these men were more highly-educated, affluent, and 
politically conservative than the other respondents.  The Yale 
researchers hypothesized that the “white male effect” may be an artifact 
of the norms generally held by this group of white males and the social 
roles threatened or supported by certain social policies embedded in 
regulation.  Corporate law also embodies certain policy choices; these 
policy choices have lately become hotly contested.128  The Yale study 
may illuminate how cultural norms, race, and gender interact to 
influence board evaluation of risks and decision-making. 
After a discussion of how risk evaluation operates in corporate law, 
the section summarizes the theory of CIP cognition and the results of the 
Yale study on this type of cognitive bias. 
A.   The Role of Risk in Corporate Law 
Generally, risk is narrowly defined as “exposure to the chance of 
injury or loss.”129  In this narrow context, risk is assessed by weighing 
the expected benefits versus the expected costs.  A more expansive 
definition of risk includes not only an assessment of an expected benefit 
versus an expected cost, but also “considerations such as uncertainty, 
dread, catastrophic potential, controllability, equity [and] risk to future 
generations.”130  Risk is often defined in the context of a specific 
field.131  For example, in the context of investment decisions an accepted 
definition of risk is “the chance that an investment’s actual return will be 
different than expected.”132 
Gender, Race and Perceived Risk: The ‘White Male’ Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159, 160 
(2002).  The complete list of twenty-five hazards, from higher perceived risk to lower perceived 
risk, is: cigarette smoking, street drugs, AIDS, stress, chemical pollution, nuclear waste, motor 
vehicle accidents, drinking alcohol, sun tanning, ozone depletion, pesticides in food, outdoor air 
quality, blood transfusions, coal/oil burning plants, climate change, bacteria in food, nuclear power 
plants, food irradiation, storms and floods, genetically engineered bacteria, radon in homes, high-
voltage power lines, VDTs [video display terminals], medical X-rays, and commercial air travel. 
Id. at 161. 
 128. The policy choices perhaps are not as hotly contested as the policies underlying the 
regulation of abortions, the environment, and access to guns.  However, recent changes in federal 
corporate law have been highly politicized. 
 129. THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1660 (2d ed. 2006). A 
review of several sources reveals that risk is generally defined as a weighing of expected loss or 
injury. 
 130. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science:  Surveying the Risk Assessment 
Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, § I.C. (1997). 
 131. See, e.g., Dictionary.com, Risk, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/risk (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2007) (listing thirteen definitions of risk, in several contexts including insurance, 
medicine, crime, and investments). 
 132. Id. 
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The notion of risk—defined as weighing the expected benefits of a 
transaction versus the expected costs—in the context of corporate 
governance is part of the foundation of corporate law.  For example, the 
“traditional” conception of the corporation is that it exists for the 
pecuniary benefit of its shareholders.  A corollary is that the function of 
corporate management is to operate the corporation to maximize 
shareholders’ pecuniary gain.  Some disagree with this traditional 
conception of the function of corporations and corporate executives.  But 
even these commentators use the language of risk assessment; that is, 
they discuss corporate and executive goals in terms of maximizing 
shareholders’ or stakeholders’ gain given the risk characteristics of 
certain strategies.133 
Shareholders are expected to diversify to minimize investment risks 
due to economic cycles, bad management, and other risk factors.134  For 
example, in Basic v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court adopted 
the notion that public securities markets are efficient – that is, all 
publicly known information is reflected in the price of shares.135  This 
efficient capital markets theory presupposes that shareholders may 
diversify stock holdings, and reduce shareholder’s risk of bad decision-
making on the part of the management of any particular company.136  
The notion of shareholder diversification underlies elements of a federal 
cause of action against public company directors and management for 
misstatements and omissions in violation of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 Section 10(b).137 
Courts, at times explicitly but more often implicitly, acknowledge 
that boards engage in risk assessments.138  Courts reason that generally 
directors are in a better position to weigh the costs and benefits of a 
particular business decision—from selling the corporation’s assets to 
devising internal controls—than are judges and legislators.139  Under the 
business judgment doctrine, courts give great deference to the unbiased, 
good faith decisions of directors—even if later events prove that the 
directors’ assessment of the risks was incorrect.140  Courts give lesser 
 133. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Processor Financial Innovation, 
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX.L.REV. 1273, 1278-83 (1991). 
 134. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 135. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-49 (1988). 
 136. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See infra note 229.  See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 85-86, 108-09. 
 139. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 109. 
 140. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 DEL. 
C. § 102(b)(7) (West 2007)). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/4
BURCH_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:45 PM 
2008] THE MYTH OF THE UNBIASED DIRECTOR 535 
 
deference to decisions involving board conflicts of interest and little or 
no deference to fraud, illegal conduct, and bad faith board decisions.141  
For example, if the risks are entirely business risks, courts and 
legislatures defer to the judgment of business persons and the risk of loss 
for bad or negligent director decision-making falls on the 
shareholders.142  Alternatively, if a business risk arises from conflicts of 
interest, courts and legislatures give less deference to the judgment of 
business persons; the risk of loss for fraudulent, illegal, and bad faith 
conduct falls on the directors.143 
The above discussion is not an exhaustive explanation of the 
positive and normative values assigned to the function of risk in 
corporate law.  Instead, it offers some illustrations of the importance of 
the risk assessment concept in regulating and governing corporations. 
B. Emotions and Risk Perception 
Recent studies show that individuals lack information, time, and 
capacity to maximize their utility and make decisions in their own best 
interests—that is, to act as rational economic actors.144  Instead they 
resort to heuristic substitutes to evaluate risks.145  One heuristic 
substitute is emotion—i.e., individuals often act out of their emotions 
and not out of a rational evaluation of utility-maximizing strategies.146  
When individuals rely on an affective response, their actions reflect bias 
because emotions distort information processing.147 
A court may be willing to tolerate a certain amount of emotionally 
distorted information processing.  For example, courts may assume that 
the greater the amount of compensation received, the more likely the 
compensation will influence the director’s judgment.148  Director 
 141. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]usiness judgment rule extends only as far as the 
reasons which justify its existence.  Thus, it does not apply in cases in which corporate decision 
lacks business purpose, is tainted by conflict of interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win 
decision, or results from obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 142. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 108-09. 
 143. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner recently conducted a study that 
shows that boards rarely bear the risk of loss due to a combination of exculpatory provisions, 
insurance provisions, and state statutes that allow indemnification of directors’ expenses for the 
costs of defending a law suit.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 144. Kahan, supra note 12, at 2. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 2-3. 
 148. See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-54 (Del. 2004) (balancing evidence of 
friendship versus evidence of a professional reputation to be upheld). 
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compensation of $250 per hour may be high enough to constitute bias,149 
but a nominal fee, which directors may even agree to return, may be too 
small for courts to perceive an emotionally distorted decision. 
Emotions aid cultural evaluations of risk.150  Individuals draw on 
their emotions “to perceive what stance toward risks coheres with their 
values.”151  Values derive from cultural norms.152  Individuals use 
emotions to form “rational attitudes about what it would mean for their 
cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is 
dangerous and worthy of regulation.”153  An individual takes emotions 
into account in deciding whether a particular set of values or norms 
expressed by a particular legal rule is congruent with her own set of 
norms.154  For example, if an individual values egalitarian norms, then 
the person is more likely to favor increasing environmental regulation.155  
Such regulation would limit commercial activities; if those activities 
were limited, then there would be fewer distinctions in wealth and 
economic status and a more egalitarian world.  On the other hand, if an 
individual values hierarchical and individualistic norms, then the person 
is less likely to favor increasing environmental regulation because such 
regulation would signal, “a challenge to the prerogatives and 
competence of social and governmental elites.”156 
Classical economic theory is a theoretical basis for much of 
corporate law.  The theory suggests that emotions (such as those that 
might arise if one’s social status is threatened) do not play a role in the 
cognition of risk.157  Instead, cognition of risk may produce emotions as 
a “reactive byproduct.”158  Under this view, individuals “process 
information about risky undertakings in a way that maximizes their 
expected utility.”159  In other words, when making decisions, emotions 
do not sway rational individuals.  Rational individuals engage in a 
“utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits.”160  Thus, more information 
 149. See Telxon v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 265-66 (Del. 2002). 
 150. Kahan, supra note 12, at 2-10. 
 151. Id. at 9. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 9-10. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 10. 
 157. As described above in Section II, much of corporation law is grounded in classical 
theories of economics. 
 158. Kahan, supra note 12, at 5. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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regarding the costs and benefits of certain courses of action should lead 
to a correct assessment of the risks of certain courses of action.  
However, a growing body of research suggests that, contrary to 
economic theories, more information does not make for better decisions 
or better risk evaluations.  Rather, emotions play a role in this cognitive 
process. 
Corporate law has a renewed emphasis on ensuring the adequate 
flow of information.  While this is a good thing, more information about 
board roles, the risks of engaging in certain borderline activities, and the 
costs and benefits of certain corporate strategies may not lead to better 
evaluation of the risks. 
C.  The Yale Law School Cultural Cognition Project’s Study on 
Cultural Bias and the White Male Effect 
Empirical research shows that risk perceptions are skewed across 
gender and race.161  In particular, evidence shows that “race and gender 
differences in risk perception can be attributed to a discrete class of 
highly risk-skeptical white men . . . [who] hold certain anti-egalitarian 
and individualistic attitudes” in comparison to members of the total 
population.162  This skewing of risk perception has been referred to as 
the “white male effect.”163  Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, 
Paul Slovic and C.K. Mertz, researchers at Yale Law School, built upon 
this body of work by conducting an empirical study to determine 
whether gender and race alone or cultural norms account for varying risk 
perceptions, and in particular for the “white male effect.”164 
1. The Study 
The Kahan study was designed to test whether the “white male 
effect” was an artifact solely of race and gender or an artifact of cultural 
norms that may well “feature either gender or race differentiation or both 
in social roles involving putatively dangerous activities.”165  “The core 
idea, which can be called the cultural cognition thesis, is that culture is 
 161. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 1. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 2-3. 
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prior to fact on charged policy issues.”166  Cultural cognition shapes 
beliefs about the value of certain laws and policy, and “what individuals 
believe the consequences of such policies to be.”167  The cultural 
cognition thesis derives from two lines of social science research: 
research on cultural norms and risk perception, and research on how 
group membership affects cognitive processes.168 
Research on cultural norms and risk perception (known as the 
cultural theory of risk perception) shows that “individuals . . . selectively 
credit and dismiss claims of societal danger based on whether the 
putatively hazardous activity is one that defies or instead conforms to 
their cultural norms.”169  According to this position, competing norms 
are classified across two dimensions: “group” and “grid.”170  In this 
typology: 
[A] high group worldview supports a communitarian society, in which 
collective needs trump individual ones. A low group worldview, in 
contrast, coheres with an individualist social order, in which persons 
are expected to secure their own needs without collective assistance 
and without collective interference. A high grid worldview favors a 
hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, rights, 
political offices and the like are distributed on the basis of conspicuous 
and largely fixed social characteristics—such as gender, race, class, 
lineage. A low grid worldview favors an egalitarian society, in which 
such characteristics are denied significance.171 
Research on group membership and cognitive bias demonstrates not 
 166. Posting of Dan Kahan to Empirical Legal Studies Blog, 
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/cultural_cognit.html (June 6, 2006 , 5:57 
EST) (emphasis in original). 
 167. Id.  In a recent blog posting, Dan Kahan offered the following hypothesis: 
On guns, for example, hierarchical and individualist worldviews predict the view that 
guns are "safe" among both men *and* women; however, the effect of those worldviews 
on men is much much [sic] larger. That fits our theory insofar as we say hierarchical and 
individualist men have a bigger investment in access to guns to perform roles that are 
status-enhancing for them. But insofar as inividualist and hierarchist women still are 
more disposed to see guns as "safe" than are solidarist and egalitarian ones, it seems 
strange to say they are holding back on status-anxiety grounds; female hierarchs and 
individualists are motivated by status-anxiety relative to egalitarians and solidarists, but 
not nearly *as much* as male hierarchs and individualists. 
Posting of Dan Kahan to Empirical Legal Studies Blog, 
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/white_male_stat.html (June 5, 2006, 
10:51 EST). 
 168. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
 169. Id. at 4. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Kahan, supra note 166. 
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only that individuals adopt as their own the beliefs of certain groups to 
which they belong—”in groups”—but also individuals tend to reject 
factual information when the information reflects beliefs held by “out 
groups.”172 
The authors posited that gender and race in and of themselves are 
insufficient to explain why certain individuals perceive risks differently 
from other groups.173  Instead, individuals are biased in a manner that 
furthers an individual’s status in society.174  Status is dependent on 
cultural norms subscribed to by the “in-group.”175  Thus, status is 
threatened by those holding opposing norms.176  This phenomenon is 
known as “cultural-identity-protective cognition.”177 
The Yale researchers investigated the existence of a correlation 
between gender, race, and certain cultural norms or worldviews, and 
between cultural norms and perceptions of risk.178  The aim of the study 
was to determine whether identity-protective cognition might account 
more closely for differences in risk perception.179 
The study tested norms classified across two dimensions—
hierarchical versus egalitarian and individualistic versus 
communitarian.180  The authors of the Yale study theorized that 
individuals are members of one of four groups, classified as hierarchical-
individualists, hierarchical-communitarians, egalitarian-individualists, 
and egalitarian-communitarians; that members of each group hold 
distinctly different views about the risks of putatively dangerous 
activities; and that those views conform to the values and norms 
associated with a particular worldview.181  Further, the authors of the 
 172. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 6. 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. Id. at 6. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 6-8. 
 178. Id. at 8-9. 
 179. Id. at 9-10. 
 180. Id. at 8-9. 
 181. Id. at 4-6.  The theory of cultural identity protective risk perception posits that 
“individuals adopt beliefs congenial to the groups to which they belong precisely because their 
holding such beliefs promotes their groups’ interests.”  Id. at 7.  Also, the theory of risk perception 
identifies those group-held norms and values that are most salient to influence individuals’ 
perceptions of what beliefs are in the individual’s own best interests. 
[I]n the real-world we associate with myriad diverse groups . . . . It’s not merely 
implausible but logically impossible for persons to react with identity-protective 
cognition with respect to all the beliefs that might predominate among all such groups . . 
. . “Group-grid” furnishes a parsimonious typology of highly salient commitments that 
are likely to shape individuals’ identities, and determine their group-based affinities, in a 
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Yale study theorized that gender and racial variance in risk perception 
might correlate with worldviews.  Moreover, gender and racial variance 
within a worldview might occur depending on “whose cultural 
identity . . . is being enabled or interfered with by some putatively 
dangerous activity.”182  In other words, while cultural norms adhering in 
a worldview may account for differences in risk perception more than 
any other personal characteristic, cultural norms in combination with 
other characteristics—such as race and gender—may motivate risk 
perceptions especially “when their shared norms feature gender or race 
differentiation with respect to social roles involving such an activity.”183 
Also, the Yale study examined individuals’ perceptions of risks to 
societal and personal health and safety posed by gun control, 
environmental dangers, and abortions—highly contentious social 
issues.184  For example, assertions of environmental risk may be 
perceived as “symbolizing a challenge to the prerogatives and 
competence of social and governmental elites.”185  Thus, hierarchical 
persons should be more dismissive of environmental risks than 
egalitarians.186  Moreover, male hierarchists should be more dismissive 
of environmental risks than female hierarchists, because “[w]ithin a 
hierarchical worldview, women are primarily assigned to domestic roles, 
men to public ones within civil society and within the government.”187  
Racial variance in perceptions of environmental risks may be due to a 
tendency for “minorities . . . to be disproportionately egalitarian in their 
outlooks . . . .”188  As another example, “[t]he social roles that guns 
enable and the virtues they symbolize are stereotypically male roles and 
virtues.”189  Moreover, gun ownership historically has been associated 
with prerogatives belonging to white, hierarchical males.190  Therefore, 
white, hierarchical males should be highly skeptical of the risks 
manner that transcends the scores of associations they might happen to form with like- 
and unlike-minded persons. 
Id. 
 182. Id. at 8. 
 183. Id. at 10. 
 184. Id. at 36-37. 
 185. Id. at 10. 
 186. Id. at 10. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 11. 
 190. Id. 
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associated with gun ownership and disfavor gun control, much more so 
than female hierarchists or hierarchists of color disfavor gun control.191 
Finally, the abortion debate may reflect tension between “norms 
conferring status on women who successfully occupy professional 
roles . . . with . . . patriarchal norms that assign status to women for 
occupying domestic roles.”192  Thus, relatively hierarchical individuals 
would disfavor the free availability of abortions.193  In addition, female 
hierarchists “would be the most receptive of all to the claim that abortion 
is dangerous” because “they are the ones whose identities are most 
threatened by abortion’s symbolic denigration of motherhood.”194  The 
authors predicted that “commitment to hierarchical norms . . . would 
have a less dramatic impact in accentuating the abortion-risk concerns of 
men.”195  Finally, “any race effect on abortion risk perceptions would 
originate in either the correlation of race with cultural outlooks or an 
interaction between race and cultural worldviews.”196 
The Kahan study on the influence of cultural norms on risk 
perception was just one of several conducted in the Cultural Cognition 
Project at Yale University. 
2. Study Design 
Eighteen hundred people nationwide participated in a telephone 
survey.197  The researchers collected information on various personal 
demographic characteristics of the participants and on the norms each 
held.198  The telephone survey collected other personal characteristics 
that have been known to correlate with predilection for risk.199 
The questionnaire was designed to measure worldviews with 
respect to three hypotheses.  The first hypothesis was “that relatively 
hierarchical and individualistic worldviews would diminish concern with 
environmental risks, whereas relatively egalitarian and communitarian 
worldviews would accentuate it.”200  The second was that: 
[p]ersons of hierarchical and individualistic orientations should be 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 12. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 9. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 14. 
 200. Id. at 10. 
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expected to worry more about being rendered defenseless because of 
the association of guns with hierarchical social roles . . . and with 
hierarchical and individualistic virtues . . . .  Relatively egalitarian and 
communitarian respondents should worry more about gun violence 
because of the association of guns with patriarchy and racism and with 
distrust of and indifference to the well-being of strangers. 201 
The third hypothesis was that egalitarian individualistic women 
would see abortion as safe, in line with their commitment to norms that 
confer status on women “who master professional roles,” while 
relatively hierarchical individuals would see abortion as more risky. 202 
3. Study Results 
The study’s results indicated that while individuals of certain races 
and genders might be more likely to perceive risks in certain ways as a 
group, race and gender alone did not account for differences in risk 
perception.203  Instead, perceptions of risk correlated positively with 
norms that furthered social status, and not with objective measures of 
risk.204  In other words, individuals tended to minimize the risks of an 
activity if the cultural status of the individuals as a group depended on 
that activity.205 
Generally, “[d]ifferences in the perceptions of white males and 
others for all risks were relatively muted among persons holding 
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews and were nonsignificant with 
respect to gun risks and abortion risks.”206  However, “[t]he difference 
between the mean risk perceptions of white men those of white females 
and minorities was pronounced among persons subscribing to 
hierarchical worldviews for each of the risks examined.”207  Also, 
African-Americans were disproportionately egalitarian and 
communitarian.208 
The researchers found that “cultural orientations explain gun-risk 
perceptions better than any other factor, including one’s gender, race, 
region of residence, community type, political ideology, personality 
 201. Id. at 11. 
 202. Id. at 12. 
 203. Id. at 30-31. 
 204. Id. at 30. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 18. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 22, 25. 
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type, and so forth.”209  In addition, gender and race operated on 
worldviews to influence risk perception.  Indeed, male hierarchists and 
individualists were motivated by status anxiety relative to male 
egalitarians and solidarists, and much more so than female hierarchs.210  
Also, individualists were motivated by status anxiety relative to female 
egalitarians and solidarists.211  Further, “increasing hierarchical and 
individualistic worldviews induce[d] greater risk-skepticism in white 
males than in either white women or male or female nonwhites.”212  
Moreover, “risk skepticism about guns was most pronounced among 
white male hierarchists and male individualists.”213  This finding was 
consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis about gun-risk perceptions.214 
The findings on environmental risks also confirmed the researchers’ 
hypotheses.  First, “individualistic men and individualistic women react 
with status-protecting skepticism when commerce and industry are 
attacked as dangerous,” and more so than communitarians.215  Second, 
hierarchical men and hierarchical women worried less about 
environmental risks than did egalitarians, but “women discounted 
environmental risk less than men [discounted such risks] as their 
respective orientations became more hierarchical.”216  Third, race 
variance “was attributable to the disproportionately egalitarian and 
communitarian worldviews of African-Americans.”217  In sum, the 
statistical analysis revealed that “the white male effect for environmental 
risks observed in the sample as a whole was, as hypothesized, 
attributable in its entirety to the extreme risk skepticism that hierarchical 
commitments induce in white males.”218 
The results on perceptions of abortion risks also were consistent 
with the researchers’ hypotheses.219  As respondents’ worldviews 
became more hierarchical, they became more concerned about abortion 
risks, and as their worldviews became more individualistic, they became 
 209. Kahan, supra note 166. 
 210. See Kahan, supra note 167. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Kahan et al., supra  note 11, at 25. 
 213. Kahan, supra note 167.  Kahan further explained that “the hierarchic associations that 
guns bear have historically been confined to whites, white male hierarchs have the biggest 
investment of all in seeing guns as safe (indeed, we found, that such individuals believe that gun 
ownership enhances rather than reduces public safety).”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 22. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 23. 
 219. Id. at 27. 
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less concerned about abortion risks.220  The cultural orientation scales 
added to the predictive power of the researchers’ cultural-identity-
protective cognition theory.221  Moreover, gender and race interacted 
with cultural worldviews.  For example, as their respective orientations 
became more hierarchical, women worried about abortion risks more 
than men worried about these risks.222  Indeed, “all of the gender-related 
variance in the sample was attributable to the extreme risk sensitivity 
associated with being a white female Hierarch.”223  However, “being an 
African-American heighten[ed] concern about abortion risks 
independent of cultural worldviews.”224 
IV. MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CIP COGNITION THROUGH 
EDUCATION AND LEGAL RULES 
Could CIP risk perception impact board decision-making in some 
way that one really needs to worry about?  Perhaps it could.  To the 
extent that certain cultural norms predominate on corporate boards, the 
theory would suggest that CIP risk assessment bias may systematically 
influence director decision-making.  Further, the theory may allow 
predictions about the kinds of decisions and scenarios that risk bias is 
most likely to influence. 
A. What Does the Study Add to Our Understanding of How Cognitive 
Biases May Operate in Director Decision-making? 
The “white male effect” is a well documented form of risk bias.  A 
growing literature documents other types of bias.  Yet, courts are 
reluctant to give more scrutiny to directorial decision-making; some 
explicitly disregard the effect of cognitive bias on board decision-
making in certain contexts, including director review of conflict of 
interest transactions and special litigation committee recommendations.  
Where this disregard is not explicit, it is implicit in the operation of 
business judgment doctrine. 
Why should the results of the Yale study have any greater influence 
over court review of decisions than previous research on risk perception, 
cognitive bias, and emotion?  The Yale study may add detail to our 
understanding of the nature of the “common cultural bond” shared, and 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 28. 
 223. Id. at 30. 
 224. Id. 
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it points to evidence of the impact of bias on decision-making, 
specifically as it relates to risk evaluation.  For example, the Yale 
research has provided evidence of group bias that may lead to structural 
bias on boards.  Structural bias “generally refers to the prejudice that 
members of the board of directors may have in favor of one another and 
of management . . . [because of a] common cultural bond and [the] 
natural empathy and collegiality shared by most directors,” the 
management-dominated director selection and socialization process, and 
“economic or psychological dependence upon or ties to the corporation’s 
senior executives.”225  Structural bias is particularly an issue 
“[w]henever the interests of the directors are in conflict with those of 
shareholders . . . .”226 
In a sense, the study makes structural bias more than just a theory 
because it proves the existence of the effect of cultural norms on risk 
perception, even if it does not prove the effect of the bond in specific 
cases.  Moreover, the study suggests that the type of bias resulting from 
cultural status anxiety operates regardless of whether or not there is a 
conflict between the board and shareholders. 
The Yale study adds empirical support to the notion that cognitive 
bias impacts board decision-making in a way that may harm 
shareholders and perhaps that courts should recognize “the full variety of 
influences” on director behavior.227  This support did not exist at the 
time the more influential cases dealing with executive conflict of interest 
transactions were decided.  For example, systematically underestimating 
the risks of conflict transactions may lead a board to ignore red flags 
indicating financial problems within the corporation.  These problems 
might have been correctable had the board earlier identified and 
addressed the problem.  Systematic under or overestimation of risk in a 
particular institution indicates cognitive flaws in decision-making, which 
should be addressed in a systematic and cognitive way. 
The theory of CIP cognition may offer a social psychology 
explanation for certain dysfunctional board mental processes and 
behavior.  Additionally, it may offer ways to neutralize the effects of 
 225. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 
821, 824 (2004).  Velasco identifies three “paradigms for understanding structural bias”: implicit 
conspiracy (directors “consciously” pursue group interests), relationship bias (directors “favor 
friends and colleagues over distant shareholders”), and unconscious, cognitive bias (a 
“manifestation of ingroup bias”).  Id. at 855. 
 226. Id. at 821. 
 227. J. Robert Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the 
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 100 (2006-2007). 
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identity-protective cognition on individual and group decision-making.  
The next section addresses how CIP risk assessment may affect board 
behavior in three specific situations.  It describes how director education 
and changes in legal rules may mitigate the effects of CIP risk 
assessment.  It also addresses theoretical and practical objections to the 
proposals. 
B.   Specific Applications 
1.   Compensation Decisions 
Directors might minimize the risks of overcompensation in order to 
protect, by proxy, their own economic status.  Hierarchical norms assign 
males the breadwinner role.  Attempts to limit the economic potential of 
that role may threaten directors’ cultural identity.  Thus, directors may 
underestimate the risk that a compensation package is overvalued.  
Current legal rules requiring independent compensation committee 
review of executive compensation decisions, and the norms reflected in 
those rules, would not mitigate the risk of bias. 
A controversial implication of identity-protective cognition 
suggests that courts should be less sanguine about according deference 
to directors when reviewing claims that directors have breached their 
fiduciary duty of care and wasted corporate assets by awarding excessive 
compensation.228  To the extent that the Yale study identifies a 
systematic cultural-identity and status protective bias distorting director 
business risk perception, courts should be alert to the possible need for 
closer review of directors’ decision-making processes.  The standard of 
review would not require liability for mere mistakes or for negligent 
decisions.  The idea is to ensure that directors make more balanced 
business judgments, not to replace directors’ business judgments with 
the business judgment of the courts.  Gross negligence could remain the 
standard of review; this is merely an evolutionary, not revolutionary, 
change in what it means to be reasonably informed.229 
 228. The legal scholarship on structural bias suggests that court review of directors’ business 
judgment might go beyond mere review of the procedural aspects of business decision-making and 
touch on the substantive aspects.  For example, Julian Velasco proposed a “substantive 
reasonableness” standard, under which “the plaintiff should have to establish that the directors’ 
decision was unreasonable.”  Velasco, supra note 225, at 876. 
 229. If courts articulate these norms as setting a standard of good practice, then “reasonable” 
boards would follow these practices or risk liability (putting aside the issue of exculpatory statutes, 
indemnification, and insurance).  See Burch, supra note 42, at 527-28. 
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In undertaking this review, courts could ask whether management 
and the board sought arguments against a proposed course of action and 
whether the board or board committee fully considered those arguments.  
For example, courts could weigh evidence presented by directors that the 
board “considered arguments against a course of action” and challenged 
management on more controversial decisions.230  Further, courts 
routinely engage in weighing factors and so are well-positioned to 
determine if boards appropriately identified and weighed a variety of 
viewpoints.  Moreover, plaintiffs should not bear the burden of 
demonstrating that the decision-making process was flawed.  Courts 
should require directors to show balanced risk appraisals. 
2. Independent Director Approval of Conflict of Interest 
Transactions 
As described in Section III of this Article, plaintiffs’ arguments in 
favor of entire fairness review as a mechanism to address cognitive bias 
generally have been unsuccessful even though courts have become more 
willing over the last twenty years to entertain those arguments.231  
However, the bias resulting from identity-protective cognition may 
indeed cause directors to underestimate the risks of conflict transactions, 
even if the directors have no pecuniary interest in the transaction. 
Historically, conflict transactions were presumptively void.232  
Today, a director’s ability to engage in conflict transactions reasonably 
may be viewed as a necessary component of doing business and as 
essential to maintain or enhance a director’s status in business and in 
society.  Legal rules have established the norm that directors without 
certain financial, business, and personal conflicts may review related-
party/conflict of interest transactions.  By judging whether a conflict 
transaction is in the best interests of the corporation, a director may 
signal not only that he or she believes that the transaction is fair, but also 
that it is fair for the director to make that judgment.  This further 
establishes financial, business, and personal conflicts—and not other 
sources of bias—as the criteria that determines if the director is 
impartial.  These criteria become part of the status quo.  Adherence to 
this framework for evaluating bias reinforces stability, a hierarchical 
norm, and protects a director’s hierarchical self-identity.  Therefore, a 
 230. Paredes, supra note 24, at 750-51. 
 231. Velasco, supra note 225, at 840-41. 
 232. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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director may be predisposed to discount the impact of CIP bias and other 
forms of cognitive bias on decision-making. 
To the extent that a court requires an independent board committee 
to show transactional fairness regardless of independent director 
approval, the court is taking steps to counteract the effects of identity-
protective cognition bias.  Jurisdictions that require this showing may 
offer plaintiffs more protection against the CIP risk assessment bias.  
Jurisdictions adopting the Model Business Corporation Act, which shifts 
the burden of proof to the plaintiffs to show waste, may not adequately 
account for the risk of identity-protective cognition bias. 
3.   Special Litigation Committees 
In a number of jurisdictions, derivative plaintiffs must make a 
demand on the board when bringing a derivative lawsuit unless demand 
is excused.  In these jurisdictions, demand is excused if it would be 
futile, i.e., the board operated under a conflict of interest when 
undertaking the transaction and that conflict might be expected to 
interfere with unbiased operation of the board’s business judgment.  
Other jurisdictions require that demand is made on the board in all 
cases.233 
If a shareholder names a majority of the board as defendants 
because they had an interest in the transaction at the time, the board may 
appoint a special board committee to review the shareholder’s demand.  
The purpose of the committee is to determine if pursuing the litigation 
would be in the best interests of the corporation as a whole.234  If a 
disinterested board makes a fully informed and reasonable decision not 
to pursue the litigation, then the business judgment rule may fully 
protect that decision. 
Plaintiffs have argued, and some courts (a minority) have reasoned, 
that members of special litigation committees might be reluctant to bring 
derivative lawsuits not because the lawsuits are illegitimate, but because 
the members of the special committee might identify with the defendants 
and think, “there but for the grace of God go I.”235  The study raises the 
additional possibility that directors might seek dismissal to protect the 
status of the firm as a hierarchy.  Hierarchs, and hierarchical institutions, 
tend to value the status quo and incremental moves.  Suing management 
is unlikely to be an incremental move.  Also, hierarchies tend to value 
 233. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (West 2006). 
 234. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 cmt. (West 2006). 
 235. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
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stability and rational order.  Management may perceive the derivative 
lawsuit as disruptive.236  Also, shareholder lawsuits may be a threat to 
the hierarchical system of governance in which the CEO and directors, 
not the shareholders, appear to be at the top of the corporate hierarchy.  
Thus, CIP risk assessment creates a danger that the special litigation 
committee will dismiss a lawsuit properly brought to vindicate 
legitimate shareholder rights.237 
A majority of states (and federal courts applying state rules) 
recognize the special litigation committee defense.238  Several states 
have codified the defense.239  Most of these statutes are based on the 
Model Business Corporation Act § 7.44.  A minority of states recognize 
a modified version of the defense.  These states allow a trial court to 
review the committee’s decision recommending that litigation be 
terminated.  The level of review varies and generally requires 
independence and some proof of fairness.240  In these jurisdictions, the 
 236. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 116, at 89 (stating that “directors perceive the typical 
derivative suit to be the unscrupulous strike suit,” feel an “affinity” with the defendants, and are 
“particular[ly] concern[ed] that the defendants not be subjected needlessly to the opprobrium and 
inconvenience of litigation”). 
 237. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 
1166-69 (2002) (evidence shows firms who protect minority shareholders have higher valuations). 
 238. See, e.g., Roberts v. Alabama Power Company, 404 So.2d 629, 631-36 (Ala. 1981); 
Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 636-38 (Colo. 1999); De Moya v. Fernandez, 559 
So.2d 644, 645-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Millsap v. American Family Corporation, 208 Ga. 
App. 230, 231-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Allied Ready Mix Company, Inc. ex rel. Mattingly v. Allen, 
994 S.W.2d 4, 8-10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31 (N.Y. 1979); 
Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70 Ohio App.3d 702, 705-08 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 
547 Pa. 600, 611-14 (Pa. 1997). 
 239. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(f) (2007)(independent scrutiny standard); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-3634 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33- 724 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
607.07401(3) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-744, 14-3-744 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
30-1-744 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 632 (2007) (amended by 13-C § 755 and further 
amended by S.P. 608, 2007 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 289); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.241 (West 2007); 
see also Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (construing MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.241); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.44 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-545, 35-2-
1304 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2074 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293- A:7.44 
(2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-44 (2007); TEX. BUS. CORP.  ACT. art. 5.14, subs. F, H; VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.4 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.0744, 181.0744 (West 2007). 
 240. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-91 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law; trial court 
is to weigh likely recovery, discounted by the probability of liability, against the costs to the 
corporation of continuing the action), cert. den. sub nom., 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983), 
and superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-724; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779, 787-89  (Del. 1981) (trial court is to apply its own "independent business judgment"); 
Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 814-26 (Mass. 1990) (trial court must determine whether committee's 
decision was "reasonable and principled"); In re PSE & G Shareholder Lit., 315 N.J. Super. 323, 
335-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (trial court must determine whether committee's decision 
was "reasonable and principle[d]"); Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 468-74 (N.C. 1987) (trial court 
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additional protections offered shareholders may counteract the effects of 
CIP risk assessment bias. 
C. Critique 
In any proposal that may expose directors to real liability, criticism 
abounds.  If boards are systematically and structurally dysfunctional, 
then structural changes may be needed to neutralize the problem.  The 
question is not only whether the above legal and educational changes 
would work, but whether the “cure” would be worse than the 
dysfunction.241 
1. Shareholders Can Diversify Away the Risk that Non-
management Directors Will Not Exercise Unbiased Judgment 
Shareholders freely chose the companies in which to invest.  
Therefore, in theory, shareholders can choose to increase their 
investment in companies that demonstrate more balanced decision-
making.  Moreover, shareholders could choose to construct a diversified 
investment portfolio consisting of corporations assuming that some 
corporations have better corporate governance and decision-making 
practices than others.  Thus, the shareholders’ risk may be reduced. 
However, cognitive bias may be a structural problem across 
corporations.  If uncorrected, investment portfolio diversification across 
U.S. publicly traded corporations would not defuse this problem. 
2. Closer Judicial Scrutiny Will Lead to Greater Liability and 
Fewer Qualified Individuals Will Want to Serve as Directors 
The concern here is that greater scrutiny of directors’ decisions will 
lead to the possibility of more director liability.  This concern was raised 
in the seminal case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.242  However, several 
counterarguments may be raised in response.  First, although liability 
insurance costs increased after Smith, this insurance protects directors 
from personal liability.  Second, although there was a decrease in the 
must consider totality of circumstances, including committee's report, in deciding whether directors' 
action was "just and reasonable"); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 222-26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(trial court must determine whether committee's decision was "reasonable and principled"). 
 241. It is difficult to change a dysfunctional system, especially if it appears to those holding 
power within the system that they are acting functionally. 
 242. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 8 DEL. C. § 
102(b)(7) (West 2007). 
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number of qualified directors who continued to serve, the decrease was 
temporary.  Third, although some directors may leave their positions due 
to a concern that they would no longer be able to fulfill their increased 
directorial functions, perhaps directors who do continue to serve will 
understand their companies better and will make more legitimate 
decisions, which should lead to less potential liability. 
3. Directors Would Take Even Fewer Risks, at Shareholders’ 
Expense 
Directors “might be dissuaded from taking even prudent risks and 
might become too tentative” once more attention is focused on risk.243  
Alternatively, directors may realize that activities once regarded as too 
risky have more value than previously seen.244 
Further, to the extent that evidence bears out that management is 
already risk averse, some cognitive bias towards underestimation of risk 
may balance out risk aversion.245  It is not clear to what extent 
insensitivity to risk impacts corporate profitability, shareholder wealth, 
or other measures of corporate financial success.  However, a more 
balanced approach to risk-taking may result in greater profitability, and 
likely would result in better considered decisions.246 
4. Other Gatekeepers are Better Monitors 
This argument suggests that other gatekeepers are better monitors 
of corporate behavior than directors themselves.  It may be true that the 
best monitors are individuals who have no connection with the 
corporation, and can evaluate corporate and director performance 
without bias due to financial and other ties described above.  But outside 
monitors would not address the issue that CIP risk assessment operates 
on a day-to-day level as well as at the oversight and strategy levels.  
Further, these outside monitors would bring their own biases to the 
boardroom. 
 243. Paredes, supra note 24, at 682. 
 244. See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory 
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 339-40 (2007) (citing to numerous 
studies drawing a connection between gender and racial diversity on corporate boards and corporate 
profitability). 
 245. Paredes, supra note 24, at 682. 
 246. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. 
REV. 33, 51 (2003) (presence of women or minorities on boards has direct positive effect on firm 
value). 
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V.  DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research on cultural norms and risk perception, increased 
attention to directors’ monitoring role, and questions raised about the 
impact of independence requirements all heighten the need for studies of 
director behavior.  This Article suggests directions for this and other 
research, including empirical research on board interaction in the course 
of decision-making and oversight and studies of gender and racial 
diversity on boards. 
A. How Do Board Members Perceive their Roles and Functions? 
This Article draws from the Kahan study’s conclusions on how 
members of the general public perceive abortion, gun, and 
environmental risks, and applies those conclusions to corporate 
executive assessment of business risk.  In essence, this is an armchair 
exercise.  Its value lies in applying insights from empirical scholarship to 
test certain assumptions about boardroom behavior. 
However, the boardroom is a “black box” and little scholarship 
investigates the connection between behavioral assumptions in corporate 
governance law, how board members perceive their roles and functions, 
and the actual content of board communication derived from 
observation.247  Empirical research should be conducted to capture how 
members of boards of directors, corporate officers, and executives 
actually perceive and deliberate various business risks.248  This research 
could relate how courts expect directors to behave to actual director 
behavior, and ultimately may be useful in formulating rules related to 
independent boards. 
In addition, the research could relate behavior to worldviews.  One 
hypothesis is that public company boards in the United States, which 
tend to be dominated by white males, also tend to value hierarchical and 
individualistic norms over other worldviews.  This statistical finding 
would be consistent with the fact that board members are part of a 
paradigmatic hierarchy.  Further, “[p]ersons who have a high 
hierarchical orientation expect resources, opportunities, respect and the 
like to be ‘distributed on the basis of explicit public social 
classifications, such as sex, color, . . . holding a bureaucratic office, [or] 
 247. See, e.g., Dalvir Samra-Hendriks, Doing ‘Boards-in-Action’ Research, An Ethnographic 
Approach for the Capture and Analysis of Directors’ and Senior Managers’ Interactive Routines, 8 
CORP. GOV. 244, 244-46 (2000). 
 248. Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate Blog, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/07/gordon-gee.html (July 11, 2007). 
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descent in a senior clan or lineage.’”249  Such expectations would be 
consistent with corporate norms that reward ascension through the ranks.  
Another hypothesis might seek to relate patterns and content of 
communication on a particular board to norms held. 
Further, a research project might compare content of board 
communications for non-profit versus for-profit boards.  In addition, 
research might compare the content of board communications in a 
number of different countries, and relate the content of communication 
to corporate governance law. 
B. How Do Boards Really Perceive Decision-making Risk? 
Building from the behavior studies described above, in-depth 
research could be conducted to answer a number of questions about how 
boards weigh risks when making decisions.  Do boards strive to act on 
the basis of empirical evidence?  Do boards discount statements from 
senior executives that risks are low—do boards consider that senior 
executives may be understating the risks?  Do boards make riskier 
decisions than would otherwise be in the best interests of shareholders?  
What is the appropriate level of risk? 
The decision-making process appears to be routinized, even when a 
decision should be given more scrutiny.  More transparency is needed 
regarding how corporate boards function in their decision-making and 
oversight capacities.250 
C. Gender and Racial Diversity on Corporate Boards 
Would more diversity lead to “better” decision-making?  This 
Article argues that cognitive bias stemming from cultural norms leads 
public company boards to underestimate risks.  However, cognitive bias 
affects everyone to some degree.   To the extent that there is significant 
diversity on the board of a publicly traded corporation, in terms of 
worldviews as well as race and gender, the board may make decisions 
that are more legitimate because the board fully considered—and 
questioned—various perspectives.251  While the Yale study demonstrates 
 249. Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 4. 
 250. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 108-
09 (2003) (study using twenty-four different corporate governance elements concludes that 
companies with superior corporate governance measures have higher market valuations). 
 251. Carter, supra note 246, at 36 (diverse board could help “evaluate more alternatives and 
more carefully explore the consequences of these alternatives”). See also Daniel P. Forbes & 
Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as 
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that diversity may have that effect, insights derived from critical race 
and feminist theory show that diversity alone is not enough.  Board 
members holding diverse views must view each other with legitimacy. 
What barriers to legitimacy and effective communication among 
board members exist, and would those barriers negate the positive 
impact of greater diversity in terms of worldviews, race, and gender?  
Studies of director behavior, as well as critical race and feminist theory, 
may shed light on these questions.  The results of the studies could 
impact legal scholarship concerning race and gender diversity on 
corporate boards. 
D. Director Education 
Post-SOA, there has been a push to ensure that adequate 
information flows to the board and to educate directors on their 
responsibilities under the new rules.  Director education programs may 
be an ideal vehicle to disseminate factual information about contested 
matters such as the value of independent directors and the value of 
derivative litigation.  But, would dissemination of empirical information 
during director training matter?  Would better internal information 
systems improve information flow to the board and neutralize the bias?  
Empirical evidence of under-evaluation of risks might include evidence 
that share prices fell due to a particular decision (harming shareholders); 
that assets were depleted and the corporation forced into bankruptcy 
(harming shareholders and creditors); that facilities were forced to close 
and that jobs were lost (harming employees and communities).  The 
same bias that results in the under-emphasis of risks also means that 
empirical evidence that does not support cultural status will be rejected.  
Therefore, dissemination of empirical information about risks, if it can 
be found, may not change board decision-making. 
Others have proposed educating directors on their cognitive 
tendencies and training directors to overcome those tendencies.252  
Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 489, 494-99 (1999) (boards benefit from 
conflict derived from thorough consideration of alternatives). 
 252. See Paredes, supra note 24, at 740-41 (expressing the view that the psychology of 
decision-making should be a corporate governance concern, and that in order to “make risks more 
salient” directors should be trained to consider the opposite—seek dissenting views, search for 
disconfirming evidence, and interrogate assumptions more rigorously).  Stanford University has a 
well-known Directors’ College and the Roberts Program in Law, Business and Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University.  See Stanford Law School, Directors’ College (2008), 
http://www.seeuthere.com/rsvp/invitation/invitation.asp?id=/m2c523-652769787287.  The recent 
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Dissemination of information about cognitive bias and its effect on risk 
perception—metacognition—may be ineffective to change behavior.  
Mere awareness of bias created by cultural norms need not lead to 
changed norms or values. 
Scholars of behavioral economics have proposed identity affirming 
as a way to overcome cultural bias.  Identity affirming may be a more 
effective way to achieve change in board behavior.  In any event, 
research on director behavior and on CIP risk assessment would inform 
the content of education programs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although courts and commentators make assumptions about 
director behavior, little is known publicly about how corporate boards 
actually function and the content of board communication.253  Those of 
us who are not public company directors, who have not sat on corporate 
boards, and who have not conducted a case study of corporate boards 
probably know little about how directors themselves perceive their roles 
and functions.  While few, if any, would argue that there is less 
transparency today than there was in, say, 1934 when Justice Brandeis 
opined that “the best disinfectant is sunlight”254 and when the Securities 
Exchange Act became law, many probably would agree that corporate 
directors could provide needed insight into not only their degree of 
independence and disinterest, as defined in federal and state law, but 
also about how they perceive their roles and functions as members of the 
board and of board committees. 
This Article applies the findings generated by the Yale study on 
identity-protective cognition to corporate director behavior, and analyzes 
corporate governance policy and legal doctrine to further align executive 
decision-making with behavioral norms that would increase value for all 
corporate constituencies.  More research on director behavior is needed 
Directors College (held in June, 2007) did not include explicit mention of metacognition training 
(e.g., training in cognitive tendencies at play in decision-making) in the introductory materials. 
 253. Quite a bit has been written about what directors, and “independent” directors should do.  
Much of the literature begins with the Berle and Means study, see BEARLE & MEANS, supra note 
28, and continues through the 90s with the shareholder primacy versus director primacy debate.  In 
this scholarship, there is much speculation and quite reasonable conclusion-drawing about what 
directors actually do.  But there is little empirical research on how directors actually perceive their 
roles and functions vis-à-vis board committees, other directors, shareholders and other 
constituencies. 
 254. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, HARPER’S WKLY. 
(1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). 
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to determine the extent of cognitive bias on board decision-making, and 
on the interactions among board members. 
This Article has proposed a number of reasons why courts should 
give greater recognition to the effects of cognitive bias on director 
behavior on corporate boards.  While it may still be too early for 
wholesale corporate governance changes, it is not too early to examine 
more closely CIP risk perception and other cognitive biases as an 
explanation for the type of misperception of risks underlying director 
behavior in Enron, Worldcom, Hewlett-Packard, and most recently, 
Whole Foods.255 
Nonetheless, given the tentativeness of the evidence with respect to 
corporate directors as opposed to members of the general public, it is 
unlikely that a court would fully credit a derivative plaintiff’s cognitive 
bias argument, supported by the empirical evidence on cultural 
cognition’s effect on risk perception.256  However, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that cultural norms do effect directors’ risk perceptions.  In 
addition to further study of this issue, the Article proposes a number of 
steps that courts and corporations could take to deal with cognitive bias, 
including enhanced review of directors’ decisions, and director 
education as a method to counteract cognitive bias on corporate boards. 
 255. Enron and Worldcom have come to epitomize financial and accounting fraud and the lack 
of director perception of that fraud, in part due to directors’ inattention.  Hewlett-Packard has 
become the “poster child” to illustrate pretexting—an investigative practice involving gathering 
confidential information through the use of invented stories.  See Yuki Noguchi & Ellen 
Nakashima, House Panel Digs Deep in HP Spy Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at D01.  
Hewlett-Packard’s former board chair, Patricia Dunn, former general counsel, Ann Baskins, and 
former chief ethics officer, Kevin Hunsacker, resigned after it was revealed that they had used 
pretexting to determine the source of a board leak of confidential information regarding Hewlett-
Packard’s long-term strategic plans.  Id.  (The source was Hewlett-Pakard board member George 
Keyworth.)  Whole Foods and the SEC are investigating Whole Foods’ Chief Executive Officer, 
John Mackey’s anonymous internet postings attacking rival Wild Oats’ management as “clearly 
doesn’t known what it is doing” and the company “has no value and no future.”  See Whole Foods 
CEO’s Anonymous Online Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19718742/.  Whole Foods later attempted to purchase Wild Oats.  Id.  
In time, HP and Whole Foods behavior may come to be seen as hubris, underestimation of risk, 
overconfidence, or another type of cognitive bias. 
 256. A study also could determine if business law decisions reflect a cognitive bias on the part 
of the judiciary. 
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